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be outdated and unnecessary within the next decade due to a permanent system in America allowing RPAs unimpeded flight. However, in the meantime, it is of the utmost critical timeliness that a course of action be created, agreed upon by all parties involved, and integrated into a national disaster preparedness plan. In the unfortunate event this plan is invoked, the homes, properties, businesses, national treasures, and, most importantly, lives that potentially can be saved are countless.
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SECTION 1: Introduction
How should the military, government, and civilian agencies integrate remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs) into emergency response plans in support of relief efforts following a major disaster?
Currently, RPAs cannot participate in domestic catastrophic events due to restrictive Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations, such as having a chase plane or undergoing lengthy waiver processes. The DoD's most current UAS (Unmanned Aircraft Systems)
Roadmap acknowledges that "Current access for UAS is greatly limited primarily due to FAA regulatory compliance issues that govern UAS operations in the NAS [National Airspace System]." 1 Although tests have been accomplished recently to validate the FAA's current guidance on UAS flight in the NAS, the efforts to integrate Department of Defense (DoD) RPAs into emergency response plans are extremely limited. A two-year study on UAS in the NAS, commissioned in 2010 between the FAA and Insitu, a subsidiary of Boeing, will likely not field results for many years. 2 The FAA considers the integration discussion a long-term activity, with the milestone of integrating civil unmanned aircraft systems into the NAS targeted for no later than September 2015. 3 In 2011, Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn advised that "Nearterm efforts can help increase UAS access to the NAS immediately, while a full set of regulations, policy and procedures, standards, and technology must be developed and considered to allow UAS appropriate access to the NAS in a safe and efficient manner." 4 The Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) has not yet included RPAs as a viable resource in its National Response Framework (NRF), the governing guidance for national response to a disaster. 5 However, much like the airspace over Afghanistan, where the military is able to safely control manned and unmanned assets, the FAA and FEMA could control and coordinate RPAs in the airspace surrounding disaster relief efforts. The National Strategy for Homeland Security promises that, "We will bring to bear the Nation's full capabilities and resources to save lives, mitigate suffering, and protect property." 6 Thus, there may be an inconsistency between the established doctrine and effective planning for emergency situations, resulting in the most modern and capable resources being underutilized.
Ultimately, the affected agencies should coordinate, approve, and implement a plan for DoD RPAs to participate in FAA airspace in support of FEMA's incident management plans because the platforms are an invaluable asset during recovery efforts after a national disaster.
A modified case study will frame the methodology, specifically using an explanatory research model to answer the "why" and "how" questions of this problem. Highlighting two historical events, Hurricane Katrina and the Haiti earthquake, as cases for motivation and lessons-learned, the research will determine feasibility of integration, identify roadblocks, and suggest a way forward for the government to integrate RPAs to effectively participate in domestic disaster relief efforts. An in-depth analysis of current RPA limitations, FAA regulations, and FEMA response plans will identify the roadblocks. This research does not claim to support the premise that RPAs are the sole or primary aircraft responsible for relief missions, but rather indicates how to integrate RPAs into an already robust air response, to include such assets as helicopters, cargo transporters, and medical airlift. However, the niche filled by RPAs in emergency response, the dedicated and persistent incident awareness and assessment is one currently unfilled by other platforms. This research should be valuable to the global RPA community (both military and civilian alike), as well as participants at all levels of the FAA and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including FEMA.
SECTION 2: Background
In 2010, an RPA executive committee comprised of affected agencies responded to Congress' discovery of the slow progress on national airspace integration. The committee directly acknowledged the requirements of each agency's participation and need for cooperation in its NAS Access Plan:
It is the intent of Congress, by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, to provide an orderly and continuing means of assistance by the Federal Government to State and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage, resulting from an emergency or disaster. Further, it is the purpose of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 to enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents by establishing a single, comprehensive national incident management system. This management system is designed to cover the prevention, preparation, response, and recovery from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. 7 With the proliferation of RPAs, there will soon be many platforms, both military and civilian, flying in the skies over America, as evidenced in Figure 1 . Congress passed this week to make it easier for the government to fly unmanned spy planes in U.S. airspace." 10 From the news media's negatively connoted use of the term "drone," to the fear of personal privacy infringement, combined with the lack of positive publicity, the RPA platform and associated community have not earned a warm reception from the general American population.
Currently, unmanned aircraft are not permitted to fly outside certain restricted areas in the US, most of which are reserved for military use. However, the capabilities of these systems are undeniable: unarmed intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, incident assessment, and search and rescue, with loiter times over 24 hours and the ability to provide real-time data to supported units with low overall risk. The applications of such capabilities are endless: border patrol, counterterrorism, counterdrug operations, and disaster relief efforts. As depicted in The capability to produce a real-time infrared (IR), electro-optical (realistic-looking daytime TV), low-light, fused IR and low-light, and synthetic aperture radar (SAR, can see through clouds) full-motion video could be a boon to search and rescue, damage assessment, cordon placement, and humanitarian efforts after a major disaster. This mitigation would have satisfied the FAA's "see and avoid" requirement. Unfortunately, all of these coordination attempts fell short of the means necessary for RPAs to participate, especially during a time when federal disaster response was being pushed to its limits, both internally and publicly. The impact of RPA flight denial in Hurricane Katrina response can never be fully quantified; however, the initiatives that arose in the aftermath sparked internal, informal, non-integrated disaster response plans within the MQ-1 community at Nellis AFB.
These efforts helped initiate integration opportunities for RPAs to contribute support during the next major disaster to strike NORTHCOM's area of responsibility.
Haiti Earthquake
The earthquake which struck the destitute island nation of Haiti on January 12, 2010, is also a significant case for analysis. The 7.0-magnitude earthquake with epicenter near Port-auPrince, Haiti, immediately inflicted severe structural damage to Haiti's already poorly built infrastructure, causing a death toll in the thousands.
DoD RPA crews, aircraft, and a maintenance package were mobilized, again, from the MQ-1 community, which had relocated 40 miles northwest of Nellis AFB to Creech AFB in 2006. Rather than fly LOS for the entire sortie, based on ill-suited infrastructure on the island of Haiti and terrain impeding constant contact between the controlling crew and the aircraft, the planners opted for remote split operations via satellite (shown in Figure 3 ). In essence, an LRE would launch the aircraft LOS, and then hand it over to a crew at Creech through satellite communications. Based on needing immediate feedback during critical phases of flight, the LRE would then takeover the flight upon returning to base, once within LOS, mitigating the satellite delay. As depicted in Figure 3 , the aircrew sits in the "GCS," ground control station, which can either be located near the disaster area or, using satellite connectivity, half a world away. An LRE was deployed to Puerto Rico, where the team launched the aircraft from
Aeropuerto Rafael Hernandez, a civilian airport near Aguadilla, Puerto Rico. 15 The launch and recovery windows were specified based on avoiding the bulk of civil air traffic at Aguadilla.
Because the airfield's control tower closed Class D airspace from the time the aircraft took off until it was established in the TFR corridor, the airfield was virtually closed for a 15-minute window twice a day. The aircraft had to fly in the NAS for approximately 15 minutes before reaching the TFR. Since the FAA governs airspace over Puerto Rico, the crews were constrained by the Code of Federal Regulations (CFRs) and Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs), requiring a chase plane or observer since they were not in an active restricted or warning area. Since a chase plane was not feasible, planners opted for ground-based observers, who visually monitored the aircraft while it transited to the airspace over international waters, remaining in contact with the controlling crew. Due to RPA pilot shortages, ACC complied with the FAA requirement for the observers to be rated pilots by supplying four pilots from F-16, KC-135, and C-130 Air National Guard units. Armed with binoculars, radios, and a beach chair, the spotters were evenly spaced along the transit flight path, and remained in constant radio contact with the aircrew. On one occasion, the observer spotted a civilian Cessna flying through the offlimits TFR, radioed the Predator, and informed the control tower of the violation. The RPA crew visually acquired the traffic, avoided it, and continued on its transit.
The need for RPA flight included search and rescue, damage assessment, communications relays, and security overwatch. With nearly all the communications equipment on the island destroyed, an airborne radio asset would have been helpful for radio relays between command and control units and first responders, sequencing of humanitarian airlift flights which were overwhelming the tiny airport, and coordinated relief efforts. However, once deployed, the primary mission for the RPA became convoy support. Crews determined the extent of the infrastructure damage and viability of bridges in advance of United States Agency for
International Development and United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization food convoys, identified rioting groups trying to stop convoys, and rerouted convoys to avoid rioters, when necessary. They also identified roadblocks set up by warlords in
Port-au-Prince.
While the mission impact of the two RQ-1s' contributions to the JTF were not notably significant, they were groundbreaking for the coordination accomplished. "Today, the Air Force 
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The military departments have a robust process for establishing manned aircraft flight standards and procedures. However, the current ambiguity in national regulatory guidelines and standards make RPA compliance difficult to measure. While some RPAs may already be operating safely, until the necessary RPA-specific "standards, regulations, and agreed-upon compliance methodologies are defined, establishing regulatory compliance for more routine operations is difficult. In the meantime, UAS operations within the NAS are treated as exceptions through the COA process." issued in CY2010. 23 The FAA has developed three versions of special COAs, to include the DoD/FAA Memorandum of Agreement, disaster relief, and emergency COA shells. Only one RPA, the US Air Force's Global Hawk, has been granted continual NAS access. 24 DoD received a national COA, the first, and only, of its kind for Global Hawk flight in the NAS in 2003. 25 Since the RQ-4 Global Hawk flies at altitudes of 40,000 26 to 60,000 feet, it is not a safety concern for mid-air collision avoidance or other de-confliction issues for the FAA. 27 The FAA's advertised time to process an application to granting the COA is normally 60 business days, however some complex missions may take longer, while renewals should only take 30 business days.
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Controllers are primarily concerned with three issues related to RPA flight in the NAS, containment, lost link, and flight recovery. 29 Containment ensures the aircraft must be able to maintain a given, defined airspace. Lost link profiles ensure the aircraft has a predictable and safe means of returning to a recoverable point if command and control of the aircraft is lost.
Flight recovery is the aircraft having an independent means of safely terminating flight in the event the link is unrecoverable.
Other FAA requirements for RPAs in the NAS are unnecessarily restrictive for DoD assets. DoD assets fly 24/7, mainly due to an IR-camera which senses infrared returns (heat), rather than the visually-acquired daylight spectrum. Also DoD RPAs fly in airspace and conditions that would not meet the requirement for VFR flight. The RPA pilot must maintain currency in a manned asset. 30 DoD RPA pilots do not maintain currency in manned assets, based on full-time RPA duties, limited budget for training, and unnecessary duplication of effort. 
FEMA Response and Incident Management Plans
In March 2011, President Obama declared in Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8),
The national preparedness system shall include an interagency operational plan to support each national planning framework. Each interagency operational plan shall include a more detailed concept of operations; description of critical tasks and responsibilities; detailed resource, personnel, and sourcing requirements; and specific provisions for the rapid integration of resources and personnel. 33 The way current response guidance is built the NRF is the over-arching guidance, like doctrine, with specific annexes for major categories of events. The annexes attempt to describe the likely participants and describe the coordination organization structure. Federal, state, and local authorities develop their own interagency concept of operations (CONOPS) and operations plans (OPLANS). However, the current CONOPS/OPLANS, which are nested in the NRF, will soon undergo a major change based on PPD-8. The future of FEMA is the National Preparedness Goal, an interagency mission statement, from which emerges the National Preparedness System (NPS).
The NPS directs the creation of five national frameworks: Protection, Prevention, Response, Recovery, and Mitigation. While the NRF concentrates mainly on response, these five high-level guidance documents will cover the whole spectrum of NPS activities. Each of the frameworks will then have a subordinate document called the Interagency Operations Plan.
These non-incident specific documents will be more detailed, to include some tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and best practices. The National Disaster Recovery
Framework was completed and released in September 2011, 34 but the remaining PPD-8 deliverables are still being developed. 35 The National Incident Management System (NIMS) is described in a companion document to the NRF that provides standard command and management structures for response activities. "This system provides a consistent, nationwide template to enable Federal, State, tribal, and local governments, the private sector, and NGOs [non-governmental organizations] to work together to prepare for, prevent, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity." 36 The fledgling NIMS will only mature with the implementation of the NPS. A CONOP "…describes the concept of operations for integrating and synchronizing Federal capabilities to accomplish critical tasks, and describes how Federal capabilities will be integrated into and support regional, State, and local plans to meet the objectives described in the Strategic Plan." 37 It is ideally suited for an RPA integration plan, although each affected agency will need to develop its own OPLAN.
The National Military Command Center (NMCC) will initially coordinate any military response required. 38 DoD maintains a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) for each of the 10 FEMA regions, and is the single point of contact at the joint field office (JFO) for requesting assistance from DoD. 39 
NIMS suggests that the Operations Section Chief may establish an Air
Operations Branch when the incident requires complex air operations. 40 Furthermore, it suggests an Air Tactical Group should be designated when helicopters and fixed-wing assets must operate simultaneously in the incident airspace. 41 Figure 5 below depicts organizational structure when a JFO is established for an event. The level of interoperability of RPAs with all assets, both air and ground, will have a significant impact on effectiveness of RPA contributions to the combined efforts of responding agencies. Due to the regulatory, legal, and ethical differences from executing warfare, using DoD assets in the US homeland requires further investigation and coordination. The airborne persistence and suite of sensors and radars that characterize UAS bring added capabilities to disaster and emergency assistance. DHS employs UAS for situational awareness, critical infrastructure assessment, and emergency response to aid planners and leadership on how best to employ resources to stem suffering and damage. Recent examples include the 2009 river flooding in North Dakota and Minnesota and the 2010 Mississippi Canyon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. In both instances, it was determined that the disasters were of such severity and magnitude that effective response was beyond the capabilities of the State and the affected local governments and that Federal assistance was necessary. In both incidents, DHS employed UAS to provide aerial imagery to help assess flooding/oil extent and concentration. 52 However, all RPAs used in these disasters were DHS assets, not DoD assets. Specifically, DHS' COAs, RPA flight would be fairly easy to coordinate. However, the COAs typically cover only the minimum required airspace for the mission of that specific platform, and generally only near the airfield from which they operate. This limitation is a key factor for DoD participation in DSCA events.
Defense Support of Civil Authorities

SECTION 5: Current Status of Integration Efforts
In the FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Congress directed the creation of an Executive Committee, comprised of DoD and the FAA. 61 "The sense of Congress was that progress has been lagging in the integration of UAS into the NAS for operational training, operational support to the Combatant Commanders, and support to domestic authorities in emergencies and natural disasters." 62 The UAS Executive Committee (ExCom) is tasked to work on those efforts that will provide near term access for RPAs operated by federal agencies. The RPA community is currently fully tasked, maximizing FTU throughput to have a just-in-time aircrew production rate for ongoing and newly initiated combat air patrols (CAP).
However, as evidenced by RPA support of JTF Haiti, the DoD's primary missions (FTU throughput and CAPs for combatant commanders) can still be accomplished while DSCA operations are in effect. A short-term surge, such as was the Haiti effort, can be absorbed by DoD, however, long-term or significant asset sourcing will need to be vetted by the SecDef. 
